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Will a judgment of conviction rendered in a criminal prosecution be admitted in evidence by the Colorado courts in a purely civil
action to establish the truth of the facts on which such judgment
was rendered? The answer to this question necessarily involves a
careful consideration of two Colorado cases.1 The earlier of the two,
wherein such evidence was admitted, was decided in 1937. The
latter case, decided in 1955, held such evidence to be inadmissible.
The purpose of this discussion is to attempt to propound from the
two decisions a rule of future practical applicability.
In North River Inc. Co. v. Militello,2 the insured pleaded not
guilty and was convicted on a charge of burning the insured property. Before trial on the criminal charge the insured sued the insurance company to recover on the policy. The record of the criminal action, then pending on review, was admitted in evidence in
the civil action for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the
insured. After judgment on the insured's conviction had become
final the insurance company moved in arrest of, and to vacate the
judgment rendered for the insured in the civil action, upon the
ground that the conviction as affirmed was a final and irrevocable
determination of the fact that the property had been destroyed in
fraud of the insurer, precluding recovery against the defendant company. The motion was overruled by the trial court. However, the
Supreme Court held that denial of the motion was error, vacated
the judgment, and entered an order for a new trial. In doing so,
the Court said that logic compelled a relaxation of the long-followed
rule of complete exclusion of evidence of a criminal conviction in
such cases, and that greater weight should be given to the evidence
when the fact of guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt in
a trial in which the accused was surrounded by all the safeguards
afforded by law. Moreover, the Court felt that this was particularly
true when the occasion, as in the instant case, bore a close relation to
an inter-party matter in that the defendant in the criminal action
was convicted of defrauding the insurance company by the identical
1 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Holland was the author of both
opinions.
2 100 Cola. 343, 67 P. 2d. 625 (1937).
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act resulting in the loss upon which he predicated his claim for recovery against the same company. The Court stated: 3
The record of conviction in the criminal case was admissible in evidence in this case, and when so admitted
carried proof of the conviction to be considered as prima
facie evidence of the fact that plaintiff destroyed or caused
to be destroyed the property for which he now seeks to recover judgment in the amount of the insurance thereon.
It is such presumptive proof as to shift the burden to him
to establish his innocence thereof. When the established
fact of guilt was presented upon the first opportunity, as
here, it was sufficient to vitiate the civil judgment otherwise established.
By virtue of the Militello decision, it would seem that Colorado had in 1937, joined what Professor McCormick terms "the
growing minority" of jurisdictions which have come to insist that
"common sense and consistency of adjudication require that a judgment of conviction, offered against the person convicted in a later
civil action involving some of the same issues (should) be '4admitted
as evidence of the facts on which the judgment was based."
The Militello case rested tranquilly in the Colorado Reports
until 1955, when one Moyle sued defendant Brown for the wrongful
3 100 Colo. 343 at p. 347, 67 P. 2d. 625 at p. 627 (1937).
4 McCormick on Evidence, p. 618 (1954).
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death of Moyle's minor son, alleging that Brown had caused the
death of the child by driving an automobile in such a wantonly
reckless manner as to strike the child, who was riding a bicycle on a
public street.5 At the trial, copies of an information charging Brown
with manslaughter in the killing of the child, and a copy of the
verdict finding him guilty of that charge were admitted over the
objection of Brown, who had entered a plea of not guilty in the
criminal action. The trial court, relying on the Militello case, directed a verdict for the plaintiff, leaving only the question of
damages to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the admission of copies of the information and of the verdict
finding Brown guilty of manslaughter was error. The Court stated:6
The courts are almost unanimous in ruling that such
evidence, being evidence of the conviction of a traffic charge
of manslaughter based on the operation of an automobile in
a civil case is inadmissible. (Emphasis supplied).
The only case law cited in support of the proposition that evidence of the prior criminal conviction was inadmissible was the
West Virginia case of Interstate Dry Goods v. Williamson 7 and the
A. L. R. annotation to that case.8 Oddly enough, the Williamson
case, to be discussed in more detail hereafter, in no way involved
the operation of an automobile. The annotation following the case
does state that the general rule "supported by the great weight of
authority" is that a judgment of conviction or acquittal rendered
in a criminal prosecution cannot be given in a purely civil action,
to establish the truth of the facts on which it was rendered. However, in a more recent annotation by the same authority, it is stated
that while the earlier cases justified the statement of a general rule
of exclusion, the modern tendency seems to be to abandon any such
general rule applicable to all criminal judgments. Moreover, it is
stated that an increasing number of decisions have approved the
admission of such evidence on the ground that the safeguards afforded the accused under criminal procedure are greater than those
5 Val. 8, C. B. A. Ad. Sh. No. 4, p. 131; 290 P. 2d. 1105 (1955).
6 Val. 8, C. B. A. Ad. Sh. No. 4 at p. 132, 290 P. 2d. 1105 at p. 1106 (1955)
791 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301, 31 A. L. R. 258 (1922). (The report of the Moyle case, as it appears in the Advance Sheets, cites only the A. L. R. annotation following the West Virginia case.
However, the West Virginia case itself is cited in the Moyle opinion as reported in 290 P. 2d. 1105
at p. 1106.)
831 A. L. R. 261.
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in a civil action and that the convicted party therefore has no cause
for complaint when evidence of his criminal conviction is admitted
in the civil action. The latter annotation further points out that it
may reasonably be argued that evidence of convictions for minor
traffic violations should be excluded where the safeguards afforded
and a moderate fine
the accused may be more or less perfunctory,
may be accepted as a matter of convenience.9
Concerning minor traffic violations, the 1953 Colorado Revised
Statutes has a specific provision which is found under the chapter
entitled Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles and which reads as
follows: 10

No record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this article shall be admissible as evidence in any
court in any civil action.
However, in the Moyle case the prior crime was manslaughter.
The fact that, while in the commission of that crime, Brown may or
may not also have been guilty of one or more minor traffic violations, would seem to be merely incidental insofar as the applicability of the foregoing statutory provision is concerned. Possibly
the Court entertained this view, since the Moyle opinion makes no
reference whatever to the above statute.
The Williamson case, previously referred to as being the only
case law cited in the Moyle opinion, held that in a civil suit to recover the value of certain property stolen from the plaintiff, the
record of a conviction of the defendant of the larceny of the property was not competent evidence to establish the fact that the defendant stole the property. The most remarkable aspect of the
Williamson case is that at the time the Supreme Court of West
Virginia considered the question the criminal conviction had already been reversed and the prosecution dropped altogether by the
prosecutor." Consequently, this holding would appear to be rather
dubious authority for the rule of exclusion, since the fact was that
there was then no existing judgment of conviction for the Court
to exclude.
The Moyle decision does not expressly overrule the Militello
case. On the contrary, the Militello case is not mentioned in the
9 18 A. L. R. 2d. 1289, 1290.
1o 13-4-140, '53 C. R. S.
'91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301 at p. 302, 31 A. L. R. 258 at p 259, 260 (1922)
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Moyle opinion, despite the fact that in a very well-written brief
to the Supreme Court counsel for Moyle relied heavily on the
earlier holding. Since the Moyle opinion does not refer to the
Militello decision, it follows that both rules must now be the law
in Colorado. That being so, it becomes necessary to distinguish
two rules which, at first blush, appear to be contradictory.
Regardless of the language in the Moyle opinion, it is not
probable that the Court intended to convey the impression that the
crime of manslaughter is a minor traffic violation. Nor is it likely
that the Court intended to infer that merely because the instrumentality used in the commission of such crime was an automobile,
that the crime is therefore magically transformed into a minor
traffic violation. The reason usually advanced for the rule of
exclusion where a traffic violation is involved is that the traffic
court proceeding is generally somewhat perfunctory, and the judgment rendered is otten the result of expediency or compromise."
In the Moyle case the prior criminal conviction of Brown came only
after a tiial by jury in a court of record." The criminal trial was
neither perfunctory nor was the verdict the result of expediency
or compromise. Therefore, the reason for the rule in regard to
traffic cases would seem to be absent here, even if it be conceded
that manslaughter with an automobile is nothing more than a
minor traffic violation.
The leading cases which have adopted the rule of admissibility
have generally involved the situation where a convicted criminal,
as the plaintiff, seeks by a civil action to take advantage of his
own wrong. Consequently, there has been some tendency to regard
14
It is to be
the rule as limited to that particular state of facts.
observed that in the Militello case the convicted criminal was the
plaintiff and was seeking to recover on an insurance policy covering
the building which he had been convicted of burning. On the other
hand, in the Moyle case the convicted criminal was the defendant
and was endeavoring to avoid the payment of damages arising frbm
his criminal act. It is often said that sound public policy will not
12 18 A... R. 2d. 1289, 1290. See also the commentary found in the Uniform
Rule 63 (20).
13 Criminal File No. C-1366, District Court in and for Adams County.
14 18 A. L. R. 2d. 1289.
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permit a wrongdoer to profit by his own wrong. This rule is clearly
applicable to the facts of the Militello case and probably justifies
the admission of evidence of the prior criminal conviction. It is
arguable that the rule is not applicable to the Moyle case because
Brown was not seeking to "profit" but was merely defending
against a civil action brought by the injured party. The troublesome question which this argument raises is: Has not the convicted criminal "profited" if he is saved from paying the damages
attendant to his criminal act?
Nevertheless, as previously stated, there is some tendency in
cases of this nature to admit the evidence of a prior conviction
when the criminal is seeking to collect damages but to exclude such
evidence where the criminal is attempting to avoid paying damages.
While the logic behind this view may be debatable, the fact remains
that some courts are inclined to place this limitation upon the
rule of admissibility.
Assuming that our Supreme Court intended by the Moyle ruling
to join the ranks of those courts who. enforce the above-discussed
limitation, then that decision merely limits the scope and application of the Militello case. If so, the two cases may be said to
stand for the following proposition: Where a convicted criminal
sues to collect damages for an injury resulting from his crime, the
record of his prior criminal conviction will be admitted in the
subsequent civil action as evidence of the fact that he committed
the crime, the reason for the rule being that public policy will
not permit a wrongdoer to profit by his own wrong. But where
the convicted criminal is sued by the party injured as the result of
the crime, such evidence will not be admitted because the wrongdoer will not be deemed to be seeking to profit by his own wrong.
One further distinction between the two cases under consideration probably deserves notice: In the Militello case the
crime involved (arson) was one requiring a specific affirmative
criminal intent; whereas, in the Moyle case, the crime in question
(manslaughter) was not one requiring actual intent. This distinction would seem to be of little legal significance, unless the
question of admissibility of evidence in such a situation is to be
determined on the basis of the degree of badness of the party
concerned. No cases from other jurisdictions have been found
which express any such distinction. However, it may be that the
Supreme Court of Colorado was impressed with the difference in
the degree of culpability between Militello and Moyle and therefore decided the two cases on some theory of moral turpitude.
Nevertheless, the later case does not give any indication that such
a distinction was intended.
This discussion began with the stated purpose of resolving
from the Moyle and Militello cases a rule capable of general application. The foregoing analysis seems to indicate that no such rule
can be formulated-only future decisions by the Colorado courts
can determine the true rule in Colorado.
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